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The size distributions of power outages are shown to depend on the stress, or the proximity of the
load of an electrical grid to complete breakdown. Using the data for the U.S. between 2002-2017,
we show that the outage statistics are dependent on the usage levels during different hours of the
day and months of the year. At higher load, not only are more failures likely, but the distribution
of failure sizes shifts, to favor larger events. At a finer spatial scale, different regions within the
U.S. can be shown to respond differently in terms of the outage statistics to variations in the usage
(load). The response, in turn, corresponds to the respective bias towards larger or smaller failures
in those regions. We provide a simple model, using realistic grid topologies, which can nonetheless
demonstrate biases as a function of the applied load, as in the data. Given sufficient data of small
scale events, the method can be used to identify vulnerable regions in power grids prior to major
blackouts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sustained and secure supply of power is a vital com-
ponent of a prosperous society. Other essential services,
such as water supply, medical infrastructure, communi-
cation, transport and so on are all dependent on the sta-
bility of their power supplies. Interruptions or outages
in the power supply can have catastrophic consequences,
as was witnessed in many occasions (e.g. August 14th,
2003 in the U.S. and Canada; September 28th, 2003 in
Italy; and July 30th, 2012 in India) [3]. Characteriza-
tions of power grid instabilities and outages, therefore,
have been active topics of research for decades in engi-
neering and physics communities (see e.g., [4–11]). An
operating power grid, particularly near its permissible
level of capacity, can suffer from large outages triggered
from small initial fluctuations or disturbances. For exam-
ple, a software failure in an early warning management
system [12], a falling tree on a line [14] or overloading by
users [15] caused the above mentioned blackouts affect-
ing, respectively, about 55, 56 and 620 million people.
An amplified response to a small scale perturbation is
a prominent signature of system-wide correlations devel-
oped near a critical point.
A clear example of correlated response in power grids is
the distribution function of the outage sizes, determined,
for example, by the number of customers left unserved
during an outage. While a random failure probability
would give an exponentially decaying distribution for
outage sizes, in reality the probability P (S) of an outage
of size S has a power law tail [19]: P (S) ∼ S−α, imply-
ing relatively higher probabilities for large outages. This
is due to local correlations and causally connected cas-
cades or avalanches of outage events. Statistical analysis
of those avalanches, particularly those demonstrating the
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universality of the exponent value α across different coun-
tries [19], has led to the identification of the dynamics of
the power grid avalanches with that of self organized crit-
icality (SOC) [16, 17]. Indeed, a connected set of objects
(grid lines) having finite failure thresholds, with drive
(customer demand) and dissipation (load unserved) is a
suitable system for showing universal collective behavior
in a self-organized critical state. Drawing such a parallel
allows for investigation of power grid dynamics using the
standard tools of SOC developed over decades [18]. Fur-
thermore, it also puts power grids in the generic class of
driven dissipative systems having intermittent activities
or avalanches with scale free size distributions. For ex-
ample, this is reminiscent of the Gutenberg-Richter-like
law seen in various scales such as originally for the earth-
quake statistics [20], also for stressed brittle solids [21],
sheared granular media [22] and so on.
While in the steady state the time series of the
avalanches show scale free size distribution with universal
exponent value, a common observation in these systems
is the variation of this exponent value with the ‘load’
on the system. Load is in general considered here to be
the relevant driving field, e.g. tectonic stress for earth-
quakes, compressive stress for fracture experiments and
so on. Specifically, if only the events occurring at a higher
stress are sampled, the magnitude of the exponent α is
smaller than what is obtained for events occurring at a
lower stress. This was first observed for sheared rocks
[23] where the exponent decreases linearly with the differ-
ential stress. Subsequently, it was observed in other fail-
ure dynamics [24], including famously for the Gutenberg-
Richter law exponent in earthquakes [25, 26]. Although
the magnitudes of earthquakes follow universal scaling,
in some regions the exponent value tends to be lower,
signaling a higher risk of large earthquakes [27].
Here we show that such lowering of size distribution
exponent with increased load, i.e. customers’ demands,
also takes place for power outage statistics. Using the
data for the outages in the U.S. between 2002-2017, we
found that the size distribution of the outages between
2FIG. 1. The sizes of large-scale outages in the U.S. follow
a power-law distribution, whose exponent changes with the
load on the grid at the time of outage. (a) We demonstrate
this by dividing outages into those occurring during the day
and night, or the summer and off-peak/winter periods. The
lower load cases (night and winter) show power-law distri-
butions with steeper distributions than the higher load cases
(day and summer). The summer/winter plots are shifted 10x
up the y-axis, to aid visibility. The inset shows the national
electricity consumption at different times (Pacific time) and
months, for 2016. This robust anti-correlation between the
load and exponent can be seen if the data are further subdi-
vided according to (b) month (3-month rolling average) or (c)
time of day (3-hour rolling average).
night and day times, where the usage level approximately
changes by 35%, are significantly different. Such changes
in the exponent are also observed for smaller regions in
the U.S., where it can be indicative of the relative risks of
outages. Indeed there is a systematic variation of the ex-
ponent value with the load on the grid for different hours
of a day and different months of a year. We are able to
reproduce this feature using a minimal model both for
a realistic topology of the U.S. grid and other simpler
topologies. The load dependence of the size distribution
exponent for outages opens a new path towards possi-
ble forecasting of large outage prone regions. For power
grids, such identifications are very advantageous, as fo-
cused mitigation efforts (e.g. upgrading lines) can help
in preventing large outages.
II. OUTAGES IN THE U.S. GRID
The size distribution of the power outages in the U.S.
has been studied, both in terms of the power left un-
served and the number of customers affected [5, 28, 51].
In fact, these quantities vary almost co-linearly, except
in a few instances involving load shed affecting e.g. one
customer, such as may be the case for a large industrial
facility. The two metrics also show power law size distri-
butions and are more or less equivalent in terms of the
exponent values [28]. For example, the cumulative dis-
tribution function for the number of customers affected
during blackouts has been reported to follow a power law,
with exponents variously estimated in the range of 0.8 -
1.3 [5, 28, 51]. Similar studies for outages in Sweden [29],
Norway [30], New Zealand [31] and China [32] also show
scale-free size distributions of power outages. Here we
show that the exponent value of such distributions de-
pends on the load carried by the power grid, at the time
of failure.
For events with a power-law size distribution, the prob-
ability of an event of size S scales as p(S) ∼ S−α. When
these events are arranged in descending order of magni-
tude, the resulting rank-plot will follow k ∼ S−Bk , where
Sk is the k-th largest event, and the exponent B = α− 1
(see Methods).
In Fig. 1(a) the rank plots, or cumulative size dis-
tributions, are given for the subsets of power outages
occurring respectively during the day (08:00-20:00, lo-
cal times), night (22:00-04:00), summer (July-October),
or winter (October-May). These periods were chosen to
correspond with the times of peak and off-peak loads, as
measured in the national electricity demand during 2016,
and shown in the inset to 1(a). All data are taken from
the public reports of the U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration [1], which lists outage events affecting more
than 50,000 consumers, or resulting in a load shedding
of more than 300 MW, as well as the hourly electricity
demand. The outage data used covers 1193 events in the
years 2002-2016.
A power law fit of the whole data set gives an expo-
nent B = 1.30 ± 0.02, consistent with previous reports
[5, 28, 51]. However, with a day/night division these
outages split into a shallower daytime distribution with
B = 1.15 ± 0.03 and a steeper nighttime distribution
with B = 1.78 ± 0.02. While it is known that there are
fewer outages at night, than in the day [28], this result
shows that those outages that do occur at night are gen-
erally also much less severe. Similarly, if the data are
split seasonally, we find an exponent of B = 1.22± 0.04
in the months of peak summer usage, but an exponent of
B = 1.74± 0.04 during the off-peak winter months.
To show that there is a significant relationship between
the load on the grid and the exponent value of the outage
size distribution, we have considered outages in rolling 3-
hour time windows. Fig. 1(b) shows the variations of
the exponent B and the load for different hours of the
day. Similarly, Fig. 1(c) shows the load and exponents
3for different months of the year, using a three month
window. For both cases an anti-correlation between the
load and the fitted exponent value can be seen. Like
a variety of other driven disordered systems, including
earthquakes [25, 26], laboratory scale fracture [24], and
sheared granular systems [2], we find that a higher load
is associated with a smaller B value, and hence a more
extreme distribution of events.
So far we have shown the temporal variation of the
outage size distribution exponent over the entire data.
However, to identify the vulnerable areas or dangerous
hot-spots on a grid, it is important to analyze such load
dependence on different spatial segments as well. The
U.S. grid is divided between 10 electricity regulatory au-
thorities [33]. We chose the largest three in terms of the
number of events and performed the similar analysis of
splitting the data between day and night and find a sim-
ilar variation in the exponent values (see Fig. 2). This
establishes that our method can be useful for identifica-
tion of a vulnerable sub-volume of a larger grid. For that,
however, one needs to calibrate the variation in exponent
with risk of large outage, which requires a large volume
of fine grained data. With the present data, requiring
more than 50,000 people or loss of 300MW of load to get
reported, such analysis is not feasible.
III. MODEL
We now explore the load-dependence of power grids
via a simple network model, with different topologies and
loading conditions. There are several approaches to mod-
eling the dynamics of a power grid, including examples
of networks obeying circuit laws [9, 34–36], sometimes
incorporating phase information [6, 43], as well as more
abstract models [37, 38], alongside a large volume of liter-
ature on failures in complex networks in general (see e.g.
[39–42]). Here we use a model of the power grid similar
to that studied in Refs. [45–47], and demonstrate how
the observed U.S. outage data match generic features of
the load-dependence of outage statistics.
Specifically, we consider a set of elements, or nodes,
having finite failure thresholds. The elements are either
arranged on a regular grid, or connected to each other
by the topology given in Ref. [48], which simulates the
Western Interconnection of the U.S. grid. The thresholds
σith and loads σ
i
l of the i-th element are related by
σith = σ
i
l + sǫi. (1)
We assign a random load σil to each element, from a uni-
form distribution between zero and one. The second term
on the right hand side provides a buffer or redundancy
for the elements. This ensures that the capacity of an el-
ement is always higher than its initial load. The random
variables ǫi are also chosen from a uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. Therefore, on average, the network carries a
load of 1/(1 + s), relative to its maximum capacity.
The dynamics of the model follows from randomly
choosing an element and equating its threshold to its load
thereby triggering a failure event. This can happen due
to external causes (storm, vandalism etc.) on a grid or
due to sudden surge in demand among the customers and
so on. The load carried by that element now has to be
redistributed among the remaining surviving elements.
That may, in turn, cause some of those elements to break,
triggering an avalanche. We can quite reasonably assume
a separation of time scales between successive triggering
events and internal redistribution of loads. Therefore,
during an avalanche the total load remains constant and
the only dynamics is the redistribution of loads in succes-
sive steps following a breakdown. An avalanche is then
the number of elements breaking until a stable configu-
ration is reached. After an avalanche, all the elements
are again restored with another random threshold and
load chosen from the same distributions. This allows an
average over disorder in the system. Clearly, the value
of s will determine the relative stress on an element with
respect to its carrying capacity. Higher the s, lower is
the relative stress.
It is important to note, however, that due to the long-
range nature of the correlation developed in the system, a
failure somewhere in the grid can trigger an avalanche or
cascade failure at a different location. Specific examples
of such events include the August 10, 1996 outage [44].
Therefore, one version of our model is long range, taking
into account the long range nature of electrical current
variation, so that a local disturbance can indeed trigger
a remote event. In another version, we take the exact
topology [48] of the Western Interconnection.
While the statistics of the avalanches can depend on
the particular topology considered, the qualitative obser-
vation of lowering of the size distribution exponent (or
that of the rank plot) should remain valid independent
of it. To begin with, we consider the two-dimensional
square lattice network. Following a local failure, the
load carried by the element is redistributed to the en-
tire remaining network. However, the load sharing de-
pends with distance from the failure point in a power law
1/|x − x′|γ (considering periodic boundary conditions).
For the simulations here we have taken γ = 2 in keeping
with the similar dependence of current flow in the random
fuse model [49]. The resulting avalanches are recorded
over time and the above mentioned rank-plots are shown
in Fig. 3 for different values of the relative stress s. The
exponent varies significantly within the range of s stud-
ied. Particularly, for the range s = 0.55 − 0.9, the ex-
ponent value changed from 0.88− 1.87. This covers the
observed range (1.2 − 1.80) in the data for the whole
country or that of its parts (1.1− 1.4).
The topology of the power grid is also an important
factor in its dynamics. The characterization of the net-
work properties is a debated issue [50], with claims of
small-world and scale-free properties in the topologies of
power grids in various countries. Nevertheless, the qual-
itative feature of stress-dependence as discussed above,
4FIG. 2. Day-night variations in outage size distributions are also seen regionally. Outages in the U.S. are divided according to
their governing Regional Reliability Council (RRC). Shown are the rank size distributions for the three regions with the most
reported events, (a) WECC, (b) RFC and (c) SERC, divided between day (10:00 - 20:00, local time) and night (00:00-06:00).
In each case the night-time outage distribution is steeper than the day-time distribution, indicating that outage events are
generally more severe at higher-load times.
FIG. 3. The rank-plot of the avalanches observed for the
two-dimensional version of the model with power-law load re-
distribution for various values of stress s. In the range shown,
the exponent value changes from 0.62 to 1.80, which include
the range seen in the data (Fig. 1).
are not expected to change with the topology of the grid.
To have a more realistic feature in our model, we have
studied the model in the exact topology of the North-
Eastern grid as reported in Ref. [48]. The load sharing
in this case is confined only among the connected neigh-
bors. The resulting statistics (Fig. 4) of the outages for
various values of stress still has a substantial overlap in
the observed exponent values.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The intermittent dynamics of the power grid outages
and its association with self-organized criticality is known
for over a decade now. Characteristic signatures, in-
cluding scale-free size distribution of the outage sizes are
seen for outages in different countries, for example, the
U.S., Sweden, Norway, China. This connection of power
grids with self-organized criticality enables comparisons
of statistics of power outages with other similar systems,
for example, that of earthquakes.
Here we show that like in earthquakes and several other
driven disordered systems, for power grids as well the ex-
ponent value of the size distribution of the avalanches,
which in this case is the number of customers affected
in an outage, depends on the load on the system. Par-
ticularly, for higher values of the load, the magnitude
of the exponent becomes smaller, indicating a relatively
increased probability for outages of higher sizes. We
demonstrated this anti-correlation between the load on
the grid and the exponent value of the outage size distri-
bution by analyzing the data for different months of the
year and different hours of the day (Fig. 1). This prop-
erty is also valid for sub-regions, for example in several
Reliability Commission areas in the U.S. The scatter plot
of the exponent values with the average load on the grid
at the time of outage show a clear signature of the decay
of the exponent value with the load (Fig. 4), which is
almost linear, as in the case of earthquakes [23].
Given the generic nature of the anti-correlation be-
tween load and avalanche size distribution exponent, we
attempted to use a toy model for power grids to explore
the effect of load dependence on the outage size distri-
bution. The model is defined as a collection of nodes,
each carrying a load lower than their randomly assigned
capacity, connected in certain topologies. We tested the
results in a square lattice topology with distance depen-
dent load redistribution, as well as the exact topology
5FIG. 4. The top figure shows the scatter plot of the expo-
nent values from Fig. 1 with the corresponding average load
showing representative error bars. A linear trend of decay in
the exponent value is observed. The figure at the bottom is
the rank-plot of the avalanches observed in the model with
same topological structure as the North-Eastern power grid
[48]. For various values of stress s the exponent value changes
from 0.1 to 1.5, which has substantial overlap with the range
seen in the data (Fig. 1).
of the Western Interconnects (Fig. 4). Depending on
the average load on the system, the model reproduces
the load dependence of the avalanche size distribution as
seen in the model for various topologies.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that scale free
variation of the outage size distribution in power grids
depends on the load on the grid at the time of outage.
The variation of the exponent, an almost linear decay
of the exponent value with the load, is similar to that
found in earthquake size distributions. Given sufficient
resolution of the outage data, the method can be used to
identify vulnerable regions of power grids, as is done for
statistical predictions of earthquakes.
METHODS
Data are collected from the U. S. Energy Information
Administration website [1], over the period 2002-2016, in-
clusive. There are 1193 reported forced (i.e. unplanned)
outages in this period affecting known, non-zero numbers
of customers, which we consider. Outage times are given
according to the appropriate local time zone. The load
values used are for 2016, and reported nationally using
the Pacific time (PT) zone as a reference [1]. Hourly load
data was taken from the 1st and 15th of every month,
avoiding weekends and holidays (specifically, using Jan-
uary 4th/15th; May 2nd/13th; and October 3rd/14th),
when load patterns would be different. Daily average
loads were collected on each day throughout the year.
Averages and standard deviations of the load were calcu-
lated from these data for each window of hours or months
used.
For fitting the outage size distributions, we use rank
plots. The events S can be arranged in the descending
order of their sizes:
S1 ≥ S2 ≥ S3 · · · ≥ Sn.
The kth ranked element has size Sk. For events with a
probability distribution p(S), the number of events hav-
ing size greater than or equal to Sk is
∫ ∞
Sk
p(S)dS = k. (2)
If p(S) ∼ S−α, one then has
k ∼ S
(1−α)
k = S
−B
k . (3)
The ranked data was fit in two ways. First, a max-
imum likelihood estimator (MLE) method [51] was ap-
plied to measure the exponent B, and an event size cut-
off. Second, we applied a least-squares fit to data that
were binned to have equal widths on a log-scale. For this
an a priori cutoff is required. This is taken as 50,000
(the requirement for reporting) or somewhat above, when
there are other signatures of under-reporting (e.g. kink
at 100,000 consumers in Fig. 2(b)). Error estimates
were checked by repeating fits on randomly subsampled
data sets (100 trials on half-sampled data); the resulting
spread in exponents is consistent with the stated fit er-
rors. While the precise exponent values differ depending
on the method of fitting used, they show same trends
with load. Fits given in the manuscript are least-squares
fits.
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